Sleeper Cells, drones and the gaps in India’s new counterterror strategy
India’s new national counterterrorism policy, PRAHAAR, puts drones, the dark web and sleeper cells on its list of threats and lays out seven pillars intended to deny terrorists their support systems — a move that has focused debate on what the document includes and what it leaves out.
Sleeper Cells and the seven pillars
PRAHAAR is presented as India’s first comprehensive national counterterrorism policy and spells out seven pillars: Prevention; swift responses; aggregating internal capacities; human rights and rule-of-law-based processes; attenuating the conducive conditions enabling terrorism; aligning and shaping international efforts; and recovery and resilience. The pillars are framed as a structure to address various types of terrorist acts and to cut off support networks that sustain those acts.
What PRAHAAR sets out
The document was released by the ministry of home affairs this week and adopts language that, commentators note, often uses the present perfect verb form "has been, " suggesting parts of the strategy have already been implemented rather than remaining purely aspirational. PRAHAAR emphasizes the role of state police and the seminality of jointness in planning and executing tactical operations, and it underscores human-rights and rule-of-law-based processes as part of response mechanisms.
Missing threads: insurgency, WHAMP and perception
Despite the breadth of the seven pillars, critics say several crucial facets were overlooked. The policy is described as Jammu & Kashmir-centric but is silent on strategies for combating insurgencies and the related WHAMP (winning hearts and minds of people) approach. The MHA charter covers combating armed movements in the Northeast and Maoism, yet the document does not lay out a population-focused insurgency strategy that the commentary calls a golden rule in such conflicts.
On governance, PRAHAAR underlines jointness for tactical operations but omits a corresponding model of jointness in governance at the apex level in states, a structure that past efforts have shown can yield positive results through a joint command of stakeholders. On human rights, the policy stresses redress but does not incorporate alienation as a factor that can distance local populations — commentators point to large-scale speculative arrests, custodial high-handedness and the deployment of bulldozers after strikes as counter-productive measures that undermine long-term outcomes.
The document acknowledges the leverage of the internet and social media by terrorists for recruitment and propaganda, yet it is silent on perception-building as part of a strategic communications policy. That omission matters to critics who argue that narrative warfare and strategic messaging must accompany technical countermeasures against drones, the dark web and sleeper cells to blunt recruitment and propaganda online.
The MHA released PRAHAAR this week; commentators and analysts have urged that subsequent iterations address the overlooked elements — insurgency-specific WHAMP strategies, joint governance arrangements, protections against rights abuses and a clear approach to perception-building — to make the policy more transformational rather than merely transactional.
