Cuba’s Self-Induced Crisis May Be Its Worst Yet: cuba Faces Power Shortages and Mass Emigration
cuba’s economy is on the verge of collapsing, with power shortages, inflation spikes and a wave of emigration among the most visible consequences. That is the assessment laid out in a recent analysis that also carried a call to "Sign up to have blog posts delivered straight to your inbox!"
Cuba Energy Shortages
Power shortages are among the most visible symptoms of the current crisis. An October 2024 blackout left the entire country without power for days; that event was only the beginning of a series of ongoing shortages that continue to this day. The analysis notes chronic "neglect" and outdated infrastructure as causes, and it says the Cuban regime can only produce about one-third of its total oil needs.
Venezuelan Cutoffs and Capture
The report describes a sequence of supply shocks. Venezuela, which until 2023 provided Cuba with another third of its oil, began cutting shipments by over 40 percent. In the wake of the capture of Venezuelan dictator Nicolás Maduro, things got worse: under significant US pressure, Maduro’s successor, Delcy Rodríguez, stopped sending oil to the island altogether.
Mexico, Tariffs and Fuel Halts
Oil imports from Mexico had increased in 2025 as Venezuelan imports declined, but those Mexico shipments were halted after President Trump issued an executive order imposing tariffs on countries that supply Cuba with oil. For almost a year and a half now, Cubans have gotten used to having power only a few hours per day.
Tourism and Transport Collapse
The energy crisis is cascading through the economy. Airlines have restricted or suspended service to the island because airplanes can no longer refuel on the island. The government has moved to shut down hotels with low occupancy, tourists have been relocated, and many are fleeing. Even Russia, described as a long-time ally of the Cuban regime, is evacuating their own. Tourism, which accounts for about 13 percent of Cuba’s economy, is coming to a halt, a development that the analysis says cannot yet be reflected in GDP estimates.
Daily Life and Institutions
Daily life has been sharply disrupted. Recent videos filmed by locals depict an almost empty Havana, because the country’s capital can no longer afford to keep public transportation running. The federal government has mandated remote work, and universities are operating virtually, though a lack of energy effectively means they have shut down. Food shortages, long part of Cuban reality, have become more acute.
Economic Metrics and Emigration
The piece traces longer-term decline as well as immediate shocks. It notes that the standard of living deteriorated under communism, most notably after the fall of the Soviet Union and the end of the subsidies it provided to the regime, which meant that Cuba’s GDP shrank by half during the 1990s. The regime says the economy declined by 5 percent last year, with an accumulated loss of 15 percent of GDP over the past five years. Official inflation stood at 14 percent in 2025; private estimates put inflation as high as 70 percent.
The economic decline is producing mass emigration. A recent study cited in the analysis suggests that up to 1. 7 million Cubans fled the country between 2020 and 2024. That study placed the 2024 population of Cuba at 8 million people. For comparison, the 2021 US Census estimated the number of foreign-born Cubans living in the US to be 1. 3 million.
The analysis also points toward broader alarm: credible experts and observers judge Cuba is likely facing the worst crisis since at least the start of the Cuban Revolution.
The commentary appeared at the Cato Institute and included the three provided headlines driving its angle: "Canada plans to assist Cuba as Washington squeezes the island", "Opinion | The Cuban Regime’s Slow Collapse", and "Cuba’s Self-Induced Crisis May Be Its Worst Yet. "
The original text concludes with an unfinished sentence: "Even though recent US action may be putting more pressure on Cuba, the dismal performance of the Cuban econ" — unclear in the provided context.
Closing: The account links long-term decline from the 1990s to acute shocks since October 2024, citing detailed figures for GDP shifts, oil supply shortfalls, inflation in 2025, tourism’s 13 percent share of the economy, and migration flows through 2024.
